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FULL FAITH AND CREDIT:
EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF CUSTODY DECREES
INTRODUCTION
The Congress, in implementing the full faith and credit clause' of the
Federal Constitution, has provided that judgments "shall have the same full
faith and credit in every court within the United States . . . as they have by
law or usage in the courts of such state, . . . from which they are taken."2
The history3 of the full faith and credit clause reveals that it was intended to
establish a degree of mandatory comity between the states of the union, and
thus avoid the complete subjection of foreign judgment creditors to the
dominating local policy of the lex fori. The cases involving judgments fall
into two main classifications; (I) those involving attempts to give extra-state
effect to money judgments, (2) and those using the judgment as res judicata
in defending a new or collateral action arising out of the same facts as the
original suit. Included in this second classification are divorce decrees.
Judicial awards of the custody of children are a by-product of such litigation.4
The question of whether admittedly valid custody decrees are entitled to
extra-state recognition under the full faith and credit clause is not entirely
settled.
The scope of this comment is limited to a discussion of the applicability
of full faith and credit to valid foreign custody decrees. There will be no
attempt at a detailed discussion of the jurisdictional5" and finality' problems
1. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and Judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and
the Effect thereof." (Emphasis added.) U. S. CoNsT. art IV, §1.
2. The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory; or Possession of the United
States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State, Territory
or Possession thereto. The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State,
Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts
within the U. S. and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and
seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the
court that the said attestation is in proper form. Such Acts, records and judicial proceed-
ings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same Full Faith and Credit in
every court within the U. S. and its territories and possessions as they have by law or
usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken. 28
U. S. C. §1738 (1952).
3. The history of the full faith and credit clause is discussed in Corwin, The Full
Faith and Credit Clause, 81 U. of PA. L. R-v. 371 (1933).
4. Corwin, suPra note 3, at 378, 381.
5. The Supreme Court has held that "(a) judgment obtained in violation of proced-
ural due process is not entitled to full faith and credit when stied upon in another juris-
diction," Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U. S. 220, 228 (1946); Williams v. North Carolina,
325 U. S. 226 (1945) (original court must have had proper jurisdiction of the parties or
the subject matter). For an excellent review of cases involving jurisdictional problems in
custody decrees see Annot., 4 A. L. R. 2d 7 (1949).
6. The judgment must be final and not subject to modification, Barber v. Barber,
323 U. S. 77 (1944); Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1 (1910). The majority of state
courts, however, have held that custody decrees are final and res judicata as to the facts
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involved in custody decree cases, except where necessary to elucidate any
problems which may subsequently arise.
THIE FEDERAL CASES
The Supreme Court of the United States in decisions involving this
specific question has not been particularly helpful. The majority and dissent-
ing opinIions in the following cases reflect the Court's division on this issue
and its failure to establish a uniform basis of recognition for custody decrees
throughout the United States. In I-alvey v. Halvey, a mother established
rcsidncec with her child in Florida and there institutcd a suit for divorce.
Service of process on the husband was made by publication; lie did not appear
in the action. The day before the Florida decree was granted, Mr. Halvey
without the knowledge or approval of his wife took the child back to New
York. Armed with the subsequent Florida decree which granted and awarded
permanent custody of the child to her, Mrs. Halvey brought a habeas corpus
proceeding in a New York court challenging the legality of the father's
detcntion of the child. The New York courts8 modified the Florida custody
decree, and this was assailed by petitioner as a denial of full faith and credit
to the Florida decree. This decision was affirmed on certiorari by the
Supreme Court.
The majority opinion as expressed by Justice Douglas proceeded on the
narrow ground that under Florida law" the decree was subject to modification
at any time, and "what Florida could do modifying the decree, New
York may do.''' 0 The Court concluded that there was no proof that the
Florida decree received less credit in New York than it had in Florida." The
Court expressly rcservcd decision on "whether the power of New York to
modify the custody decree was greater than Florida's power,"'2 and thereby
refrained from examining the applicability of the full faith and credit clause
to custody decrees as such. In a concurring opinion Justice Frankfurter
expressed the view that in the absence of changed conditions affecting
the welfare of the child, "a valid custodial decree by Florida could not be
before the court at the time of judgment, Worthy v. Worthy, 246 Ala. 18 So.
2d 721 (1944); In Re Cameron, 66 Cal. App. 2d 884, 153 P. 2d 385 (1944);
McMillin v. McMillin, 114 Colo. 247, 158 P. 2d 444 (1945); Freund v. Burms, 131
Conn. 380, 40 A. 2d 754 (1944); Bourn v. Ilinscy, 134 Fla. 404 183 So. 614 (1938);
For a collection of cases on point see Annot., 160 A.L.R. 400 (1946). For an excellent
discussion on finality in judgments, see Note 41 CoLUor. L. Rrv. 878 (1941).
7. New York ex rel. Ilalvey v. llalvey, 330 U. S. 610 (1947).
8. Ex parte Ilalvey, 185 Misc. 52, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 761 Sup. Ct. (1945), aff'd mern.,
295 N.Y. 836, 66 N.E. 2d 851 (1946).
9. FLA. STAT. §65.14 (1957). In any suit for divorce or alinony, the court shall
have power at any stage of the cause to make such orders touching the care, custody and
maintenance of the children of the marriage, and what, if any, security to be given for
the same, as from the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case may be
fit, equitable and just, and such order touching their custody as their best spiritual as well
as other interests may require.
10. New York ex rel. Ilalvey v, ltalvey, 330 U. S, 610, 614 (1947).
II. Id. at 615.
12. Id. at 615, 616.
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set aside simply because a New York court, on independent consideration,
has its own view of that custody would be appropriate."' 3 (Emphasis added.)
Justice Frankfurter's acceptance of full faith and credit to custody
decrees of sister states may be readily implied from his opinion in this
decision. 4 Justice Rutledge, in another concurring opinion, apparently
took exception to the literal mandate of full faith and credit. He declared
it to be merely a form of national policy, and that on occasion, other
national policies, e.g., welfare of children, will take precedence over it.15
The Supreme Court in the instant case contributed very little toward
settling the basis of recognition for custody decrees. The states wishing to
apply full faith and credit to valid custody decrees can use it as federal
authority to support their position and still remain quite free to disregard
decrees of other states at will by either finding a change of circumstances
or by merely stating that as parens patriae its interest in the welfare of the
child is controlling in any particular case. Throughout the msajority and
concurring opinions there appears to be. a shadow of doubt cast by the
Justices as to the validity of the original Florida decree. This was openly
expressed by Justice Jackson who concurred in the result on the grounds that
the record did not show proper jurisdiction in the Florida court.', In view
of the divergent opinions it is the author's view that the Halvey case is
not valid authority for any expression of federal policy in regard to the
applicability of full faith and credit to custody decrees. The decision inter-
preted Florida law and concluded that a state in deciding whether to abide
by a foreign custody decree, should determine what effect would be given
to such a decree by the state which rendered it. The decision failed to
create any original federal law. No valid federal policy in this area can be
authoritatively supported by it except through implication and rationalization
by state tribunals. By the use of hindsight obtained through the subsequent
case of May v. Anderson)7 the Court could have reached a proper result
purely on jurisdictional grounds as indicated by the brief concurring opinion
of Justice Jackson.' 8
In May v. Anderson'" the parties were domiciled in Wisconsin until they
separated and the wife moved to Ohio. The husband obtained an ex parte
divorce in Wisconsin and was awarded custody of the children who at the
time were visiting their mother in Ohio; she did not participate in any way in
13, Id at 617.
14. But cf. Justice Stone's dissent in Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202 at
213, 214 (1933). "But if we are to read the decree as though it contained a clause, in
terms, restricting the power of any other state, in which the minor might come to reside,
to make provision for her support, then, in the absence of some law of Congress requiring
it, I ain not persuaded that the full faith and credit clause gives sanction to such control
by one state of the internal affairs of another."
15. See note 10 supra at 619, 620.
16. See note 10 supra at 616.
17. 345 U. S, 528 (1953).
18. See note 16 supra.
19. 345 U. S. 528 (1953).
19581
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the proceedings. The children, on the strength of the Wisconsin decree, were
returned to the father. However, upon a subsequent visit of the children to
Ohio, the mother refused to surrender them. The ex-husband, relying on the
Wisconsin decree, filed a petition for habeas corpus in an Ohio state court.
20
He was granted relief on the ground that the Wisconsin decree required full
faith and credit. This was reversed by the Suprcme Court of the United
States.
The majority of the Court held that the Wisconsin decree was not
entitled to full faith and credit because it was rendered without personal
jurisdiction over the mother 1.2  Mr. Justice Burton in expressing this view
declined to decide the procedural validity of the Wisconsin decree, but
instead characterized a mother's right to custody as a personal right, which
could not be terminated by an ex parte divorce decree. 22 The dissenting
Justices, Jackson and Reed, 23 were of the opinion that the Wisconsin decree
was valid due to the court's personal jurisdiction over the father and the
children.2 1 This disparity of opiiion results from different jurisdictional
approaches towards the basic nature of the action; i.e., whether it is one in
personam2.1 or one in rem."r The conclusion was then reached, at least by
implication, that without exception a valid judgment is entitled to full faith
20. The lower court's opinion is printed in the Brief For Appellants, p.a. It was
affirmed in 91 Ohio App. 557, 107 N. E. 2d 358 (1951 ),aff'd mem., 157 Ohio St. 436,
105 N. E. 2d 648 (1952),
21. May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528, at 534 (1953). "We find it unnecessary
to determine the children's legal domicile because, . . . that does not give Wisconsin ...
the personal jurisdiction it must have in order to deprive their mother of her personal
right to their immediate possession."
22. Id. at 533, 534. "we have before us the elemental question whether a court
of a state . , . may cut off her immediate right to . . .custody . . . of her minor children
without having jurisdiction over her in personarn. Rights far more precious to appellant
than property rights will be cut off if she is to be bound by the Wisconsin award of
custody .... In the instant case, we recognize a mother's right to custody of her children
is a personal right entitled to at least as much protection as her right to alimony."
(Emphasis added.)
23. Id. at 537.
24. Id. at 534. Although the Court noted that there was a technical domicile with
the father, the question of the children's domicile was left open in the Court's opinion.
For a discussion of children's domicile, see Goodrich, Custody of Children in Divorce Suits,
7 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 4-5 (1921). See note 21 supra at 539, the dissent, in holding 'Vis-
consin did have jurisdiction, and therefore the decree was valid, felt that the majority
placed the convenience of a "leave-taking" parent above the right of \Wisconsin to pro-
niote the welfare of children domiciled in Wisconsin.
25. May v. Anderson, 345 U. . 528, 533 (1953). "It is now too well settled to
be open to further dispute that the Full Faith and Credit clause and the act of Congress
passed pursuant to it do not entitle a judgment in Personam to extra-territorial effect
if it be made to appear that it was rendered without jurisdiction over the person sought
to be bound. Baker v. Baker, Eceles & Co., 242 U. S. 394, 401 (1917)."
26. Id. at 540, 541, Jackson, J., dissenting, "This decision appears to equate the
jurisdictional requirements for a custody decree to those for an in personarn money judg-
nient. One reads the opinion in vain to discover reasons for this choice, .. .." It is
this writer's opinion that the majority's view as to the nature of the action being one
in personam will prevail over the dissentor's attempt to retain the domicile concept and
in reni approach to custody actions. This is certainly the current jurisdictional approach
to divorce actions. See note 45 infra.
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and credit.-7 Mr. Justice Minton concurred with the dissent on the ground
that the Wisconsin dccrec was not properly challenged under Ohio law and
being therefore valid on its face commanded fill compliance by the Ohio
courts. 28  Mr. Justice Frankfurter rendered a separate opinion, 2  concurring
with the result reached by the majority. It attempted to modify the import
of the holding of the majority and answer the views expressed by the
dissenters. He declared that the Court had not, as he understood it, decided
that the Wisconsin decree was invalid per se but only that the full faith
and credit clause did not require Ohio under the facts of the instant ease
to accept the foreign decrce.3 1 The lack of personal jurisdiction over one
of the parties thus becomes a sufficient excuse for a sister state to ignore a
prior decree and to adjudicate custody on the basis of its own interest in the
welfare of the child. A "child's" welfare in a custody case has such a claim
upon the state that its responsibility is obviously not to be foreclosed by a
prior adjudication reflecting anothcr state's discharge of its responsibility at
another time."31 Under this view the interstate enforcibility of even juris-
dictionally valid custody decrees is left to the discretion of the courts of a
sister state when they have a legitimate interest in the children. The present
position of Justice Frankfurter seems to be in conflict with his earlier view
as expressed in Halvey v. Ilalvey. 2  The absence of any explanation or
clarification of his position in the Iah'ey' case at best makes his future
position in this matter unpredictable. His statement, that the Ohio court
would not have deprived the wife of due process in recognizing the prior
decree,"3 appears to conflict with the rationale of the majority opinion;
an opinion in which lie concurred. This conclusion is based on his premise
that the Court did not decide that Wisconsin lacked jurisdiction. While
not categorically stating that the Wisconsin decree was basically defective
as a deprivation of property without due process, that seems to be the logic
of the holding."91 If the Court had not considered the decree invalid per se,
27. See note 22 supra, the implication is that if the court did have in personam
jurisdiction over the other its decree would have been valid. See also May v. Anderson,
345 U. S. 528, 537, Jackson, J., "If Wisconsin had rendered a valid iudgment,
the Constitution not only requires ever state to give it full faith and credit, hut, . . .
commands that they shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States . . . as in the courts of such state . . . from which they are taken."
(Emphasis added.)
28. May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528, 543 (1953).
29. Id. at 535.
30. Ibid.
31. Id. at 536. Perhaps J. Frankfurter's view here may be rationalized with the
Halvey case, in that he is insinuating here that the mere passage of time since the prior
adjudication is the change of conditions necessary to allow a court to exercise its discretion
as parents patria. Mere "lapse of time" is a very narrow interpretation of "change of
condition"; see STUMBERC, CONFLICT OF LAws at 328 (2d ed. 1951).
32. llalvey v. llalvey, 330 U. S. 610, 617 (1947). See also Ehrenzweig, Interstate
Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 Mien. L. REv. 345, 359 (1953).
33. Ibid.
34. See note 28 supra, at 535.
35. See note 22 supra. All three dissenters thought that the opinion of the court
was on jurisdictional grounds; see note 39 infra.
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how could it have reached the decision it did without discussing the appli-
cability of full faith and credit to what would then have been a valid judg-
ment of a sister state? Tie fact that the Court apparently considered the
lack of personal jurisdiction over the wife as the only element depriving the
Visconsin decree of extraterritorial effect :'t supports the conclusion that they
felt it would have been unenforceable even in \Visconsin. The contrary
assumptio in the concurring opinion that the decree was valid appears to be
misconceived.
The insistence by Justice Frankfurter that the jurisdictional question
was not decided by the majority, may be rationalized as an attempt to retain
the status concept of custodial relations. The status concept had been the
traditional approach used in solving the jurisdictional problems in custody
cascs a7 But the Court had stated that a parent has the same personal right
in a child as a wife has in alimony.:2  Thus, the Court treats the parental
rights to custody as property rights and consequently the \Visconsin award
should be void in toto as a deprivation of property without jurisdictional
due process.-I9  The rationale of Justice Frankfurter's concurrence suggests
that the national policy of child welfare should take precedence over the
national policy of unity embodied in the full faith and credit clause. 4 0 This
approach was used by Justice Rutledge concurring in Halvey V 1-alvey. t
This view necessarily requires the retention of the status concept, which is
essential in order for a state to effectuate its legitimate interest in the
welfare of its citizens.' The argument that the status rule is necessary in
36. Ibid.
37, See RFSTATE.MENT. CONFLICT "OF LAUS §119, 146 (1934); cf. RESTATEMENT
CONTINIJED, CONrLICT OF LAWS §117 ('Teut. Draft No. I, 1953). See Stnmberg, The
Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 8 U. or Cm. L. REV. 42. 56 (1940). But cf.
Goodrich, Custody of Children in Divorce Suits, 7 Cosr.i, L.Q. 1, 67 (1921). Notes,
Effect of Custody Decree in a State Other Than Where Rendered, 81 U. OF PA. L. Riv.
970 (1933); Jurisdictional Basis of Custody Decrees. 53 ll.Aiv. L. REv. 1024 (1940).
38. May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528. 534 (1953), "In the instant case, we
recognize that a mother's right to custody of her children is a personal right entitled
to at least as much protection as her right to alimony." (Emphasis added.)
39. Id. at 537; the dissenters apparently felt that this was the view being taken by
the Court, as the only escape from obedience to the Wisconsin decree, Finding the
decree valid and not lacking in due process, the dissenters felt it required full faith and
credit and under no condition would following it he optional to Ohio.
40. Id. at 536. "Interest of a state other than its duty towards children may
also prevail over the interest of national unity that underlies the Ful Faith and Credit
clause."
41, 330 U. S. 610, 619-620 (1947); "'he result seems unfortunate in that, appar-
ently, it may make possible a continuing round of litigation over custody, perhaps also
of abduction, between alienated parents. 'hat consequence hardly can be thought con-
dusive to the child's welfare. And, if possible, I would avoid such a distressing result,
since I think that the controlling consideration should be the best interests of the child.
not only for disposing of such cases as a matter of local policy, as it is in Florida and
New York, but also for formulating Federal policies of full faith and credit as well as of
jurisdiction and due process in relation to such dispositions." (Emphasis added.)
42. For example, in divorce, a state has the power to protect its legitimate interest
in the welfare of its citizens, if but one spouse is domiciled there, because that gives it
jurisdiction over the marital status in which its domnicilian is involved, Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942). In another case the Court upheld the validity of a
Nevada decree obtained ex parte by a husband, residcut in Nevada, insofar as it dissolved
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custody cases for the welfare of the child is subject to rebuttal. As pointed
out by the Court, the right to custody involves a relation which is almost
wholly physical4 : and affects considerably fewer legal relations than other
status relationships.4 4 The attempted retention of the status premise in the
face of the majority opinion results, for all purposes, in a view that custody
proceedings arc in rem as far as due process is concerned but in personam
in relation to full faith and credit. 45 The status therefore is the rcs through
which the state could effectuate its interest in the parties. The majority's
treatment of "custody" as a property right has the effect of destroying the
res which the state could control as an interested party, and in theory if
not in fact, requires an in personam jurisdictional due process when adjudi-
cating custodial rights. It is submitted that the position taken by Justice
Frankfurter was an attempt to limit the holding of the Court to the particular
circumstances before it and to retain the status concept of custodial relation-
ship beween parent and child and thus, in effect, retain an in rem jurisdic-
tional due process requirement in custody proceedings.
In the recent case of Kovacs v. Brewer,4 the Supreme Court of the
United States had an opportunity to settle the question of the applicability
of the full faith and credit clause to valid custody decrees. The Court
avoided the important question before it by remanding the case to the state
court for clarification, "without expressing or impliedly indicating any views
about.., [it],""
4
In the Kovacs case an action was brought in North Carolina to enforce
a New York custody decree. The decree was a modification of a previous
the marriage status. However, it held Nevada powerless to cut off a spouse's right to
financial support under the prior decree of another state. "The result in this situation
is to make the divorce divisible-to give effect to the Nevada decree insofar as it affects
marital status and to make it ineffective on.the issue of alimony," Thus, a state's power,
in ex parte divorce proceedings, is limited to a determination of the status of the party
over which it has iurisdiction; Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S, 541, 549 (1948). See also Arm-
strong v. Armstrong, 350 U. S. 568 (1956) (The Court here cited May v. Anderson
as jurisdictional authority); Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U. S. 555 (1948).
43. See note 22 supra.
44. E. g., in divorce, the right to remarry, drower and curtesy rights, etc.; in guardian-
ship, the capacity to handle the ward's affairs and transfer his property; and rules of
descent and distribution in the case of adoption and legitimacy.
45. There is souse support for this view in the field of divorce. But, even if valid
in the divorce field, it cannot work in custody matters unless the status concept is retained,
see note 42 spra. "From the standpoint of partitioning power among states, there
may well be wisdom in having a 2ap between what due process will not forbid and what
full faith and credit will not require." Powell, And Repent At Leisure-An Inquiry Into
The Unhappy lot of Those Whom Nevada Ilath joined Together And North Carolina
Hath Put Asunder, 58 lIARv. L. Rvv. 930, 936 (1945). Harris and Cardozo, Divorce
without Domicile: Two Views on the Virgin Islands Statute, 39 CORNELL L.O. 293
(1953).
46. 78 Sup. Ct. 963 (1958). This decision was handed down subsequent to the
completion of this comment. It was inserted in the section on Federal Cases in order
to make the paper as current as possible. The author wishes to call the reader's atten-
tion to the fact that all discussion preceding and following the insertion of the Kovacs
case, was completed before its issuance and does not in any way reflect or attempt
to reflect its effect on any of the cases discussed in any section of the paper.
47. 78 Sup. Ct. 963, 966 (1958).
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divorce decree which had awarded custody of a female child to the paternal
grandfather pending the discharge of the father from the Navy. The father
and grandfather appeared through counsel at the New York modification
proceeding. The child was not present at the hearing. Since the original
decree, issued six years earlier, she had been domiciled with the grandfather
in North Carolina. The modified decree was granted fourteen months prior
to an attempted enforcement by the mother.4 8  The North Carolina trial
court made numerous findings of fact and declared that the child's welfare
to be controlling and that it was not bound by or required to give effect to
the New York decree.19 Although the issue of "changed circumstances"
was raised in the pleadings,1'" the Supreme Court of North Carolina' avoided
it and without specifying any particular reason, upheld the trial court's
"conclusion of law." 2 It then went on to declare that the New York decree
was jurisdictionally defective because at the time of the modification the
child was a resident and cloiciliarv of North Carolina. " ' The Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari" to consider the claim that
the North Carolina courts had failed to give full faith and credit to the
judicial proceedings of another state. The case was remanded "to the North
Carolina courts for clarification, and if they have not already decided, so
they may have an opportunity to determine the issue of changed circum-
48. The original custody award was made on January 17, 1951, and resulted from
a divorce action which found the wife guilty of adultery. The modification was Obtaincd
in November, 1954, after the mother married Mr. Kovacs who was the correspondent
in the original suit. The enforcement of the decree was not sought until February,
1956.
49. Kovacs v. Brewer, 78 Sop. Ct. 963 (1958).
0. Id. at 966.
51. Kovacs v. Brewer, 245 N. C. 630. 97 S. E. 2d 96 (1957).
52. Id. at 634, 635, 97 S. E. 2d 100. The opinion by the North Carolina Supreme
Court is very' loosely written. The decision reads as an absolute rejection of the appli-
cability of tie full faith and credit clause to custody decree without any supporting
explanation.
53. Id. at 635, 97 S.E. 2d 100 (where the North Carolina court contends that a
custody proceeding is in rem), Contra, James v. James, 64 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1953);
May v. May, 233 A. D. 519, 253 N.Y.S. 606 (lst Dept. 1931). The law is well settled
that no judicial proceeding is entitled to full faith and credit unless it is procedurally
valid; see note 5 supra. If the Supreme Court of the United States felt that the New
York decree was procedurally defective as stated by the North Carolina court there
would have been no point in remanding the case: the decree being basically defective
would have fallen of its own weight and the North Carolina decision would have been
affirmed. The majority opinion of the Supreme Court silently passed over the conten-
tion of the North Carolina court that the New York decree was procedurally defective.
'This silence appears to support the view that the position of the state court on that mat-
ter was without merit. It is worthy of note that Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting
opinion does not refer to custody proceedings as being in rem, Ile merely contends
that the location of tie child at the lime a decree is rendered is an important fact to
be considered in determining what weight should be given to the "in absentia" decree;
Kovacs v. Brewer, 78 Sup. Ct. 963, 970 (1958). The author has already indicated his
views on the proper nature of custody proceedings inl the text and in notes 25-27 supra.
The reader is reminded that a detailed discussion of the jurisdictional problems involved
in custody is rot within the purview of this comment. For cases involving the problem
of jurisdiction in awarding custody of a child domiciled in another state see Annot., 4
A.L.R. 2d 7 (1949).
54. 355 U.S. 810 (19,7).
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stances." 5 1 It was then declared that if those courts "properly" find "changed
conditions" affecting the child's welfare, it would be unnecessary to decide the
constitutional question now before the court. 56
Justice Black speaking for the majority and relying on the llalvey57
case declared that since New York under its own law would not be bound
by the decree if a subsequent change of circumstances had occurred, neither
would the courts of North Carolina? 8 -However, as already discussed, New
York has rejected the applicability of full faith and credit to custody
decrees. " Thus, if a custody decree is subject to the unlimited discretion of
the New York courts,6 0 it could not be expected to receive any better treat-
mient in the courts of North Carolina. Tie Court must have been cognizant
of this situation, but by insisting that the North Carolina court determine
the issue of "changed couditiofis" it disregarded the New York law as
actually applied and attempted to give effect to the law as it should be.
This is in effect a condemnation of the New York view; a view supported
by Justice Frankfurter's dissent. 1 Only by disregarding the actual position
taken by the New York courts in custody matters could tile Court have
reached the aforementioned result,
The obvious implication of the majority opinion is that North Carolina
must give full faith and credit to the New York decree unless they find that
circumstances have changed siter the New York modification.62- Apparently
the court has decided that the full faith and credit clause applies to custody
decrees to the same extent as to an3 other judicial proceedings. The decision
certainly appears to be the strongest authority to date in support of this
viewpoint. The unfortunate result obtained by retaining and not defining
tie "changed circumstances" concept has already been discussed. "a
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Frankfurter finally makes his position on
the subject clear. Hc categorically states that the welfare of the child "is the
55. Kovacs v. Brewer, 78 Sup. Ct, 963, 965 (1958).
56. Ibid.
57. 330 U.S. at 615 (1947). "the state of the Forum has at least as much
leeway to disreaard the judgment, to qualify it, or to depart from it as does the state
where it is rendered."
58. See note 55 snpro at 966.
59. See the section of the text dedicated to the New York cases. Justice Frankfurter
in his dissent recognizes this to be the New York law. See note 55 supra at 969, "New
York itself, the state for whose decree full faith and credit is here demanded, has
rejected the applicability of that requirement to custody decrees."
60. Hicks v. Bridge, 2 A.D.2d 335, 155 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1st Dep't 1956).
61. Ibid. "In short, both the underlying purpose of the full faith and credit clause
and the nature of the decree militate strongly against a constitutionally enforced require-
ment of respect to foreign custody decrees."
62. See note 55 supra at 968. 969, Frankfurter, J., dissenting, "The evident impli-
cation of the Court's opinion today is that, unless 'circumstances have changed' since
the latter decree it must be given fill faith and credit ...for if the Supreme Court of
North Carolina is obliged to find that 'circumstances have changed' since the second
New York decree in order not to be bound by it, it must be that the decree has legal
significance under the Full Faith and Credit Clause."
63. See text material infra p. 114.
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polar star by which the courts must be guided in awarding custody,'' 4
and that the full faith and credit clause does not apply to custody decrees.Y5
The results which would follow if such were the law have been previously
analyzed .1q
The decision thus appears to establish a definite minority view that the
constitutional requirement of full faith and credit towards valid foreign
judgments does not apply to custody dccrees.1Y1 A majority view supporting
existence of the requirement may be implied from the Court's insistence
that the state court decide the issue of changed conditions."8
The weakness of the federal decisions, specifically the May case, is evi-
denced by the conflicting applications accorded to it byT the various juris-
dictions. This contrast is exemplified in the decisions of the courts of New
York and Florida, rcsultling in completely divergent applications of the
authoritative value of the case in custody adjudications.
Tin: NEw YORK CASES
In New York, prior to May v. Anderson,"9 the settled rule of law appeared
to be that in the absence of change of circumstances a valid foreign custody
decree was entitled to full faith and credit.70 But in Bachrnan v. Mejias
,7
the New York Court of Appeals refused to abide by the valid custody decree
of a Puerto Rican court and stated that "the full faith and credit clause
does not apply to custody decrees. The responsibility for the welfare of
infants endows the court with the power to deternmine custody [of minor
childrcn present or domiciled in the state] irrespective of the residence and
domicile of the parents and prior custody orders in a foreign jurisdiction."7 2
64. Frankfurter, J., quoting a phrase used by the Supreme Court of North Carolina,
in Kovacs v. Brewer, 245 N.C, 630, 635, 97 S.E.2d 96, 100-101 (1957).
65, Kovacs v. Brewer. 78 Sup.Ct. 963, 968 (1958). See also note 62 suora,
66. See text material infra p. 114.
67, See notes 64, 65 snfra,
68. See note 62 suprer.
69. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
70. Peopl ex ret. lerzog v. Morgan, 287 N.Y. 317, 39 N.E.2d 255 (1942); Ansorge
v. Anuour, 267 N.Y. 492, 499. 196 N.E. 546, 548 (1935) (the court held that "the
custody may be changed when circumstances or treatment since the decree render it
necessary for the child's best interests, but until such facts appear our courts cannot change
the . . . dCcree simply because they do not agree with the decision."); People ex ret.
Scanlon v. Ciaravelli, 2 A.D.2d 702, 152 N.Y.S.2d 494 (2d Dep't 1956); Sutera v. Sutera,
I A.D.2d 356, 150 N.Y.S,2d 448 (2d Dep't 1956): Finston v. Bernstein, 275 App. Div.
928, 90 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1st Dep't 1949); Young v. Roe. 265 App, Div. 858. 37 N.Y.S.2d
714 (2d Dep't 1942); Bradstreet v. Bradstreet, 256 App. Div. 1032. 10 N.Y.S.2d 699 (4th
Dep't 1939); People ex rel. Tull v. 'Tull, 245 App. Div. 508, 283 N.Y. Supp. 183 (1st
Dep't 1935), aff'd 270 N.Y. 619, 1 N.E2d 359 (1936). Contra, People ex rel. Allen
v. Allen, 105 N.Y, 628. 11 N.E. 143 (1887) (Full Faith and Credit is merely a fact or
circumstance bearina upon thIe discretion to be exercised by the court, without dictating
or controlling it); Matter of Bull (Hlellman, 266 App. Div. 290, 42 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1st
Dep't 1943); People ex rel, Turk v. Turk, 86 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
71. 1 N.Y.2d 575, 136 N.E.2d 866 (1956).
72. Id at 580, 581, 136 N.E.2d at 868, 869.
[VOL. X111
COMMENTS
The court did find that there was a change of circumstances warranting a
modification of the prior decree.73 Supported by this, it is arguable that
the court was merely expressing a dictum; that it intended its domestic public
policy should govern when in conflict with principles of comity in refercnce to
"foreign decrees'' 74 and not when in conflict with the policy of full faith and
credit in relation to decrees of sister states. This hopeful rationalization was
disintegrated in a subsequent case. In Hicks v. Bridge, " citing the Baehman"
case as authority, the court held that a state in which the children reside is
not required to give full faith and credit to a custody decree of a sister state,
"when it conflicts with the dominant domestic duty of the courts to guard
the welfare of its wards."' "- The court admitted the absolute validity of the
decree of California but maintained that, "the courts of the state, where the
children are found, have a jurisdiction that is paramount, albeit limited in
basis, to the health and welfare of the children." 78 (Emphasis added.) It is
worthy of note that the court found no intervening change of circumstances,
but felt that the recognition of the prior decree "may have an adverse impact
upon the ...children."79  It is obvious that any marital strife "may" have
an adverse effect on the children. New York claims that this concern with
the future welfare of infants within its state creates a duty in the state to
act. The chancellor is in effect given complete discretion in matters
involving custody based upon the docrinc of parens patriac. The Bachrnan8o
case, which established this position, relied on May v. Anderson"' as authority
for its conclusion. In declaring that the infant's welfare takes precedencc
over the constitutional requirements of full faith and credit, the court relied
solely on the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter. 2  Therefore, in
New York the Ma83 case has been applied as authority to deny full faith
and credit to valid custody decrees when, in the discretion of the court it
conflicts with the court's interest in the welfare of the infant. The foreign
decree is not controlling but merely a fact or circumstancc to be considered
by the court in exercising its discretion.
73. Id. at 581, 582, 136 N.E.2d at 869. But see Fuld, J., dissenting, Id at 583, 584.
136 N.F.2d at 870, stating full faith and credit should apply for the salc of iudicial
uniformity, "and no change of circumstances has been shown to justify the change in
custody now being directed." (Emphasis added.)
74. The decree in the instant case was from Puerto Rico, and not from a sister
state of the United States.
75. 2 A.D.2d 335, 155 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1st Dep't 1956).
76. 1 N.Y.2d 575. 136 N.E.2d 866 (1956).
77. See note 75 sn/ira at 339, 155 NX.S.2d at 751.
78. Id. at 340, 155 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
79. Ibid.
80. Bachman v. Meiias, 1 N.Y.2d 575, 136 N.E.2d 866 (1956).
81. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
82. See note 80 snupra at 580, 136 N.E.2d at 869, 870.
83. See note 81 supira.
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THE FLORIDA GASES
There can be no doubt that in Florida, although the welfare of the
child is the paramount consideration,84 the courts in the absence of a
showing of a change in conditions affecting the welfare of the infant, will
accord full faith and credit to a valid foreign custody decrec,,, "Uncertainties
of Florida law''86 in custody matters arise mostly in determining the juris-
dictional validity of the foreign decree. When following the general rule
that in the absence of a custody award the legal domicile of the child is the
domicile of his father, the court held that it had jurisdiction to make a
custody award as an incident to a divorce suit, even though the mother and
child were not within the state.8 7 In Randolph v. Randolph,"8 the supreme
court construed the state's joint natural -guardian statute 0 as modifying the
common law in that "the father has no right of custody superior to that of
the mother,1 "' and the court has no authority to adjudicate custody when
the child and parcut are without its jurisdiction,," It has been held that
where both parties are before the court, a custody decree may be rendered
although the child is not physically prcsent within the state; the child is
considered constructively present)' The intricate legal problems involved in
jurisdictional determinations are not within the purview of this comment,
except to the extent that May v. Anderson 3 has affected this field of Florida
law. It has been referred to at present by only two Florida decisions. 4 In
Gessler v. Gessler,05 the husband and children were living in Florida. The
wife surreptitiously took the children back to her home in Pennsylvania
84. Bennett v. Bennett. 73 So.2d 274 (Pla. 1954). Little v. Franklin, 40 So.2d
768 (Fla. 1949); Dorman v. Friendly, 146 Flia. 732, 1 So.2d 734 (1941). FSA. STAT.
§ 65.14 (1957), supra note 9.
85. Bennett v. Bennett, 73 So.2d 274 (Fla. 1954) [involved modification of
Florida decree, but court held that change in conditions must be substantial and must
affect the welfare of the child); Weldgen v. Weldgen, 62 So.2d 420, 422, (Fla. 1952),"since there has been no change of conditions the New York decree operates as an
.estoppel by judgment' and should be accorded full faith and credit by the courts
of lorida." Laibcrtson v. Williams, 61 So.2d 478 (Fla. 1952) (full faith and
credit should be given valid foreign decrees, in the absence of changed conditions,
and the court cited Ialvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947), as authority].
86. Frankfurter, I., in llalvcy v. llalhey. 330 U.S. 610, 618 (1947).
87. Minick v. Minck, Ill H-a. 469, 149 So. 483 (1933).
88. 146 Fla. 491, 1 So.2d 480 (1941).
89. L.A. SrAT. § 744.13(1) (1957) ''"Tlhe mother and father jointly are natural
guardians of their own children and of their adopted children during infancy . . ."
90. See note 88 supra, at 492, So.2d at 481, overruling Hopkins v. Hopkins, 84 Fla.
500, 94 So. 157 (1922), which had held that the statute applied only to "joint rights
of parents as natural guardians" and did not apply in a case in which each parent
claimed exclusive right to the custody and care of their minor children.
91. See also Dornin v. Friendly, 146 Fla. 732, 1 So.2d 734 (1941), cited by
the United States Supreme Court in the Hatvey case, supra note 81, as authority for
the conclusion that jurisdiction in Florida courts to award custody is obtained when
the child is actually physically present in the state or is domiciled in the state.
92. James v. James, 64 So.2d 534 (Fla. 1953).
93. 345 US. 528 (1953).
94. Dahlke v. Dahlke, 97 So.2d 16 (Fla, 1957); Gessler v. Cessler, 78 So.2d 722
(Fla. 195;).
95. 78 So.2d 722 (Fla. 1955).
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where she was legally domiciled. The husband petitioned for custody in
Florida and process was served upon the wife by publication. She appeared
specifically to contest the jurisdiction of the court. The bill was dismissed
on the ground that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the mother
by service of process by publication. The Supreme Court of Florida cited
the May 7 case in declaring that the court had to acquire in personam juris-
diction over the defendant to render a valid custody awardY In Daldke v.
Dahlke,99 a mother petitioned for modification of a custody decree awarding
the children to the father. 10 The father was domiciled in Ohio and made no
appearance. The Supreme Court of Florida held that the proceedings
were in personam and not quasi-in--rei and that the lower court was without
jurisdiction to issue a decree binding on the defendant. "Furthermore,
the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States
would not make a decree favorable to the appellant-petitioner binding on tire
appellees or the courts of Ohio in event of proceedings brought to enforce
it there.''" 1  In these decisions the court seems to follow the majority opinion
of the May'2'" case. If the court had been inclined towards the concurring
opinion of Justice Frankfurter, then a custody decree could still have beeii
rendered in the Dahlke0 a case which would have been binding on the
appellces in Florida, even though the court believed that Ohio would have
the power to deny the decree full faith and credit. In Florida, May v. Ander-
son'0 4 has been applied, according to the literal interpretation of the
majority opinion, as authority for the rule that a valid custody decree cannot
be rendered without an in personam jurisdiction over the party whose rights
in the child are to be affected. The Supreme Court of Florida has wisely
chosen to ignore the opinion of Justice Frankfurter insofar as it may be
considered as a denial of the applicability of the full faith and credit clause
to valid custody decrees. It is the view of this writer that the Florida
approach to the Ma),051 case is correct and that the New York court has
permitted itself to be deterred by an over-zealous sense of duty towards the
welfarc of minors. It seems inconceivable that the highly regarded courts
of New York are justifying their denial of the constitutional requirement of
the full faith and credit clause on the ground that it conflicts with its local
policy towards infants. The state's interest in the welfare of children is
concededlv one of the highest degree: however, the federal constitution is
the supreme law of the land, and when it conflicts with local policy or the
96. Id. at 724.
97. See note 93 supra.
98. See note 95 supra at 724.
99. 97 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1957).
100. T'he children were originally awarded to the grandparents, but they have sur-
rendered the children to the father.
101. See note 99 sufra at 17.
102. See note 93 supra.
103. See note 99 suRra.
104. See note 93 supra.
105. Ibid.
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common law, the latter must yield. In Sherrer v. Sherrer,"'" the Supreme
Court, in discussing ihe effect of the full faith and credit clause on the
recognition of foreign decrees held that the clause controls, and ruled:
"If in its application local policy must at times be required to give way,
such is part of the price of our Fcderal system."" T The New York position
may also result in encouraging parents to ignore court custody orders, abduct
the children, flec the restraining judgment in other jurisdictions and seek a
relitigation in New York in hope of a more favorable result. It should be
noted that the Florida courts though pledged to give full faith and credit
to a valid foreign custody decree, may in fact avoid obedience by merely
finding a change of conditions since adjudication of the prior decree.?'8
However, in the light of the federal command to give full faith and credit
to foreign judgments, a position conceding complete discretionary power
to the chancellor to ignore valid prior adjudications of custody matters
based upon the court's independent investigation is in complete disagreement
with the views of this writer.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article was to determine the applicability of the
full faith and credit clause to valid foreign custody awards. This writer
believes it applies to custody awards to the same extent as it does to any
other foreign judgment. Tle rcquircment of the legal technicality of the
decree being a final judgment whcn the happiness and future of infants are
in issue is absurd.''5  The jrisdictional problems involved in the entire field
of divorce and custody proccedings are highly complex. The inherent con-
flicts between the various meanings given to terms such as domicile, physical
presence, in personant, in rem, status, res judicata, finality,
actual and constructive service of process, etc., in jurisdictional approaches
106. 334 U.S. 343 (1948) (the court also held that by virtue of the full faith
and credit clause a person iS estopped to assail the validity of a decree after having
filed a general denial and having appeared and participated in the proceedings). See
also the companion case, Cc v. Coe, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
107. Id. at 355.
108. See note 85 supra.
109. People of New York ex rel. Ilalvey v. Ilalvey, 330 U. S. 610 (1947);
l"rankfurter, J., at 616, "In substance, the framers deensed it against the national welfare
for a controversy that was truly litigated in one state to be relitigated in another. The
scope of the full faith and credit clause is bound by underlying policy and not by
procedural considerations unrelated to it. Thus, in judgments affecting domestic relations
technical questions of "finality" as to alimony and custody seem to me irrelevant ... "
Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1944); Jackson, J., at 87, "1 concur in the result, but I
think that the judgment . . .was entitled to full faith and credit . . . even if it
was not a final one. Neither the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution nor
the act of Congress implernenting it says anything about final judgments or, for that
matter, about any judgments. Both require that full faith and credit be given to
'judicial proceedings' without limitations as to finality." Sayward v. Sayward, 43 So.2d
865, 868 (Fla. 1949) (a custody decree is final as to conditions then existing); Frazier
v. Frazier, 109 Fla. 164, 147 So. 464 (1933).
[VOL. MIIT
COMMENTS
to the cases in this sphere are staggering. 110 In passing, it is submitted that
the theory of in personam jurisdiction of the parties involved, regardless of
the exact and immediate presence of the child will overcome the historical
concept of domicile-status; that the theory of valid prior adjudications as
res judicata will supplant the domicile concept, and that the attempt to
apply the unwritten finality requirement of judgments to custody decrees
will disappear. It is confessed that much criticism has been levied at the
treatment this field of law has received from both the federal and state
courts, and few constructive suggestions have been made. Any well-thought
suggestion for a solution in this field is subject to an equally logical
rebuttal."1 It seems that no court or individual can offer an answer accept-
able to a majority of the state tribunals. The only answer remains in strict
adherence to the constitutional requirement of full faith and credit to valid
judgments coupled with supplementary federal legislation" 2 describing the
requirements necessary to give validity and extraterritorial effect to a judg-
ment, or in the voluntary adoption by all of the states, of a uniform domestic
relations act accompanied with the necessary conflict rules complying with the
constitutional requirements of full faith and credit.
Ronald E. Kay
110. The following statement by Mr. Justice Jackson, 16 U.S.L. Week 3123 (October
21, 1947), summarizes the situation; "Lawyers don't know what in the world to advise
their clients. Clients don't know how to dispose of their property; or whether they are
divorced or not divorced. People-simple people-have to live by these rules."
111. For a decision which was regarded in many quarters as logically indefensible,
but caused so many practical difficulties that it was subsequently overruled, see Haddock
v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
112. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933); Stone, J., dissenting at
215 note 2, "the mandatory force of the full faith and credit clause as defined by this
Court may be, in some degree not yet fully defined, expanded or contracted by congress.
Much of the confusion and procedural deficiencies which the constitutional provision
alone has not avoided mav be remedied by legislation; Cook, Powers of Congress Under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 YA"E L.J., 421 (1919)." See also Sumner, Full
Faith and Credit for Divorce Decrees-Present Doctrine and Possible Changes, 9 VAND.
L. REv. 1 (1955).
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